

WELCOME TO THE

DEC. 1, 2021

ISOAG MEETING



AGENDA

•	WELCOME/INTRODUCTION: MIKE WATSON

- DOUGLAS STREIT, ODU
- STEVE AIELLO & TIM GAWNE, AHEAD
- PATRICK ROBINSON & BINDU SUNDARESAN, ATT
- STEVE COLLE, ARI FRIEDMAN & ALYSSA CONTEREAS, NTTDATA
- UPCOMING EVENTS
- ADJOURN



Doug Streit CISO, Old Dominion University VITA ISOAG Meeting

December 1, 2021





I've come to the conclusion that if you give a data point to a company, they will eventually sell it, leak it, lose it or get hacked and relieved of it. There really don't seem to be any exceptions, and it gets depressing.

Brian Krebs

Understand what data you hold, how you are using it, and make sure that you are practicing good data hygiene.

David Mount



There's no silver bullet solution with cybersecurity, a layered defense is the only viable defense.

James Scott



Incident Management (IM) vs. Incident Response (IR)

- Data & System Breach Management Framework
- IT Security Incident Handling Standard
- Incident Handling Procedure

CISO fills a key role in IM and IR

- We have levels of severity for incidents
 - Incident Response (IR) handled by our security team
 - IR handled by Sec Team, & raise the awareness of our CIO
 - The formation of an Incident Management (IM) Team



The IM team

- System Owner
- Regulated Data Owner(s)
- Risk Management
- University Counsel
- Others as warranted CIO, VP Admin & Finance, Strategic Communication, Emergency Management Office



Security Team Support

- Support the department
- Assess and make decisions

Department IR –

Discovery, eradication, recovery

ITS provided Network, Server, IDM, and Security SME support

- CISO led IM
 - Coordinator, facilitator, and reporter
 - Interface IM Team, IR Team, in-house and 3rd party stakeholders and support teams



Forensics & Recovery

Recovery:

- In-House
- DR Plan that is tested
- HA design, backups, documentation
- Structure in place to mobilize and recover

Forensics:

- Some in-house, small scope capability
- In-house initial assessment and determination of scope
- Large-scale, domain compromise, requires external support



The four tools that proved to be instrumental:

- Firewalls
- SIEM
- Endpoint and EDR
- 2FA



1. Firewall (segmentation & visibility)

Segmentation based on risk

- Lower risk academic / research environments
- Higher risk administrative / regulated data environments

If we cannot validate the security practices, isolate:

- Academic, research environments
- Affiliates that maintain their own IT
- 3rd party businesses
- Isolate based on the risks to the institution



Firewall Lessons Learned

- Segmentation protected us
- The forensic investigation was limited due to limited logging
- Desktops on the same segments today can communicate to each other
 - In most cases there is no need to do so
 - Note to self: Restrict East-West communication on desktop networks wherever possible
 - Contain lateral movement when a desktop is compromised



2. SIEM (Security Incident & Event Monitoring)

- Goal is logging that can be managed
 - Such as check-summed
 - zipped
 - rotated
 - preserved for at least a year
- Provides data that becomes of great interest!



What to log?

- Application logs, key apps
- Firewall network traffic
- Authentication
- Key workstations

Think possible attack scenarios

- What logs would we want after a compromise?
- Develop a plan to collect those logs
- Maintain them for an extended period of time



The SIEM could have detected

- Compromised accounts
- A large file extraction
- A series of less significant events
- Helped paint a picture of what happened
- With indicators of compromise in our possession,
 - SecOps searched attempts from IP addresses, accounts
 - The University SIEM provided a valuable threat hunting resource
 - Assurance was needed
 - No lateral movement to the campus
 - No expansion of the attack



SIEM Lessons Learned

- The first, most valuable tool after an incident is the SIEM
- The University SIEM provided assurances that the attackers had not used the same addresses or accounts to attempt an attack on the main campus
- The compromise could have been prevented by certain SIEM rules that could have detected suspicious account or network activity
- Note to self: Review logging strategy and gaps, considering what we would want to know after an attack



3. Endpoint with EDR

The primary functions of an EDR:

- Monitor and collect activity data from endpoints that could indicate a threat
 - Analyze endpoint data to identify threat patterns
 - Automatic response for containment and notifications
 - Forensics and analysis tools to research threats and search for suspicious activities



3rd Party Forensic/Recovery Team

- Protocol for assurance during recovery:
 - The first question they asked, Do you have an EDR installed?
 - Their first action, Offer 30-days of EDR with 24x7 managed monitoring services
- Gave us time to develop a plan



Endpoint / EDR Lessons Learned

EDR provides visibility across the endpoints

- Mixed with an advanced firewall and SIEM provide layers of defensive monitoring and visibility and logging
- Alerts should be enabled
- Active blocking should be enabled

Note to self: The cost of EDR in terms of management and assurance of the endpoints is worth the investment



4. MFA (multi-factor authentication)

- The use of MFA with a VPN that restricts internet access to only what is essential to face the internet.
- Departmental Accounts
 - Independent of the University IAM infrastructure
 - Agility in support of instruction and research



As part of recovery,

- The department worked with the central identity team
 - Provided tools to create new accounts for their users
- New accounts tied to University identities
- All Faculty, staff and student accounts enabled for 2FA
- VPN configured for 2FA
- All staff accounts were required to use VPN



- 2FA Lessons Learned
- The University:
 - 2FA and VPN
 - Restricting internet SSH and RDP
 - Privileged account access: VPN with 2FA / profiling
 - Account event logging and monitoring



Final Thoughts...

- DLP program
- Records Management program
- Risk Management Program
- Vulnerability Management Program
- Cloud Security (AWS, Office365, AzureAD)
- Cyber Insurance



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- Firewalls
- SIEM
- Endpoint and EDR
- 2FA



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December 1, 2021



AHEAD

Ransomware, Highlighting Security Imperfections

Steven Aiello Delivery Director Security & Compliance

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AHEAD's Security Philosophy



"Security is a process, not a product"...

• The security industry has been overly focused on products.

Align security controls to proven threat actions

 Data clearly articulates the top TTPs that occur in over 99% of data breaches.



Build a program consisting of quality security processes

 There has been little focus on quality of outcomes in the security industry. Why do companies constantly pass audits, and constantly fail penetration tests?



Ransomware


AHEAD

"Ransomware is a type of malware from cryptovirology that threatens to publish the victim's personal data or **perpetually block** access to it unless a ransom is paid."

This is not "new" but is a new focus of attackers, it is not "novel"... All previous controls are applicable to protecting against ransomware.



CYBER RECOVERY & NIST CSF FUNCTIONS



The traditional NIST CSF functions help build a defense in depth model against ransomware. What ransomware has done is expose the flaws in security programs that weren't previously visible.


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AHEAD

Ransomware Attack Lifecycle



Understanding Ransomware Tactics Techniques & Procedures



AHEAD



OBJECTIVE DEFENSE IN DEPTH

- 1. Using the right set of preventative, detective, and recovery controls.
- 2. Mature the process around those controls so they are executed the same way every time.
- 3. Ensure those controls are applied to the right attacker tactics techniques and procedures.

TECHNICAL

ACCURACY


- 1. Attackers are targeting backups
- 2. Organizations are overly governance focused
- 3. Leverage something like the MITRE ATT&CK framework

PROCESS MATURITY

- 1. Security controls must be mature and executed the same way every time
- 2. Attackers exploit weak processes to circumvent protective and detective controls.
- 3. Use the ISO 33004 process maturity standard to assess the maturity

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How Mature are Your Security Processes?



AHEAD

Common Ransomware Attack Actions

Email Phishing

Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms.

(MITRE IDs: T1566.001, T1566.002, T1566.003)

Credentialed Access

Using legitimate credentials can give adversaries access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals. (MITRE IDs: T1187, T1528, T1552)

Lateral Movement

Following through on their primary objective often requires exploring the network to find their target and subsequently gaining access to it. Reaching their objective often involves pivoting through multiple systems and accounts (MITRE IDs: T1021.001, T1021.002, T1021.004, T1570)



Vulnerable Applications

Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. (MITRE IDs: T1190, T1133, T1195)

C2 & Persistence

Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. (MITRE IDs: T1136.001, T1136.002, T1098.003)

Capture Credentials

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. (MITRE IDs: T1110.001, T1110.002, T1110.003, T1003)

Defense in Depth Assessment

AHEAD cross references common TTPs with the NIST CSF functions to provide recommendations for process, tooling, and architecture. AHEAD will work with the organization to establish a current state risk posture.

AHEAD leverages in scope TTPs, NIST CSF functions, and evaluates process maturity via the ISO 33004 methodology scoring process maturity on a scale of 1 - 4

3 2.5 2 1.5 Recover Respond 1 Detect 0.5 Protect Identify Junerabe web Application 0 command and control upure Credentials Authentication to Data Data Destruction of Entitlation Lateral Movement EnalPhishing Score Meaning 0 Nonexistent Ad hoc 1 Documented 2 3 Constant Improvement ■ Identify ■ Protect ■ Detect ■ Respond ■ Recover Δ Optimized / Automated

Security Capabilities Visualized

AHEAD

Designing for Ransomware Recovery



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RECOVERY IS THE TARGET

Attackers are targeting backup environments specifically before launching their attacks. In a recent attack AHEAD helped an organization recover from, the attackers gained access to the backup admins calendar, waited for them to go on vacation, reformatted backup storage devices, and then launched their ransomware. The recovery effort took months...



RECOVERY

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Distance

Unlike a natural disaster scenario, distance to the recover environment is no longer a critical factor when building a plan for recovery from ransomware.

Bottlenecks

Bottlenecks for cyber recovery change when compared to nature disaster planning. Usually, organizations were limited by network bandwidth. This is no longer the case, now disk throughput on recovery targets, backup appliance limitations have replaced WAN links as the bottleneck


Access

Access and protecting the recovery infrastructure has become the single most important element of cyber recovery.

Monitoring and Management


A properly designed cyber recovery solution will likely need a scaled down but fully functioning infrastructure such as identity stores, DNS, monitoring, etc.

Prevention Cyber Recovery Architecture



isolated backup environment with no inbound network access except VPN

Detect & Respond Cyber Recovery Architecture



isolated backup environment all inbound sessions proxied


Questions?

AHEAD

Learn. Grow. Achieve.

thinkahead.com





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To Zero Trust

A strategy to embrace Zero Trust as a Cybersecurity Concept

Bindu Sundaresan Patrick Robinson

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Agenda



Zero Trust Start to Finish

- 1. The "What" Elaborate on the concept of Zero Trust
- 2. The "Why" What does Zero Trust Get You?
- 3. The "How" A working plan on how to move to Zero Trust



Zero Trust

Term coined by John Kindervag while working at Forrester Research in 2010

Zero Trust is centered on the belief that trust should be removed from packets – nothing outside or inside the perimeter is trusted.

Zero Trust Model

Enterprises that adopt Zero Trust leverage micro-segmentation and granular perimeter enforcement based on users, their locations and other data to determine whether to grant access to a particular part of the enterprise.

Once users, machines or applications are approved, pre-defined entitlements allow them to access what they need - and only what they need - for the task at hand.

Basic Principles of Zero Trust

- Network is always hostile
- Internal and external threats are always present
- Internal network is not sufficient to equal trusted
- Every device, user, and network flow must be proven
- Log and inspect all traffic

Zero Trust is Changing How Agencies Operate

- Ensure all data and resources are accessed securely, based on user and location.
- Adopt a least-privileged access strategy and strictly enforce access control.
- "Always verify," meaning inspect and log all traffic. Add more authentication methods to counter credential-based attacks.
- Never trust, always keep adding context and keep your roles up-to-date.
- Inspect everything

Organizations will need to incrementally implement Zero Trust principles, process changes and technology solutions to protect their data.

E Source: Clarifying What Zero Trust Is – and Is Not – Palo Alto Networks Blog - <u>https://blog.galgaltonetworks.com/2018/018/clarifying-zero-trust-not/</u> 2: The Jericho Forum (2007) *Jericha Farum Commandments*, version 1.2. Available at <u>https://collaboration.opengroup.org/jericho/commandments_vl.2.pdf</u> 3: Department of Defense Global Information Grid Architecture Vision Version 1.0 June 2007. <u>http://www.acgnotes.com/Attachments/DoD%20616%20Architectural%20Vision,%20June%2007.pdf</u>

Clarifying what Zero Trust *is not*

Zero Trust is not standardized.

No single deployment plan was issued in NIST SP800-207 and no standard exists for policy enforcement or agent data.

Zero Trust is not quick and dirty.

Replacing a decades-old strategy and framework is not fast or easy.

Zero Trust is not solutioned.

Not achieved through any single technology, tool, or tech refresh.

Zero Trust is not limited to IT and cybersecurity teams.

Multiple cross-functional stakeholders throughout the enterprise (internal and external) are affected.


Zero Trust is not cheap.

Implementation is a journey that can take years, considering each business process at a time.





Zero Trust Pillars






Zero Trust Readiness Implementation

• Organizations will need to incrementally implement Zero Trust principles, process changes and technology solutions to protect their data.


• Many organizations already have elements of a Zero Trust architecture in place.



Transitioning to Zero Trust is a journey, not accomplished with a complete replacement of technology.



Zero Trust Readiness Implementation




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😂 AT&T Business

To Zero Trust A strategy to embrace Zero Trust as a Cybersecurity Concept from a financial standpoint

In this section we will look at the financial aspects of moving from a legacy type network to a Zero Trust Network.



Overview of Zero Trust

Zero Trust Readiness (\$500k)




Users

Authentication and Authorization of Users (\$675k)

Identity		Access	Data store	Policies/ Procedures	Integration
\$200k		\$100k	\$100k	\$7 5k	\$200k
Identity and Access Management (IDAM) implementation and technologies	Physical bootstrapping	Role-based Access Control (RBAC)	Trust/reputation scoring		
Digital Identity provisioning	User authoritative System-of-Record	Single Sign-On (SSO)	User inventory store		
Onboarding/offboardin g procedures	Certificate assignment and handling	Multifactor Authentication (Biometrics, X.509, Time- based OTP, Tokens, etc.)	User accounting		




Authentication & Authorization of Devices (\$575k)





Workloads


Workload Security (\$2.2M)






Network

Network Design, Authorization and Function (\$2.4M)







Intelligence and Analytics (\$1.85M)




Automation and Orchestration (\$1.3 m)

Infrastructure- as-code	Security Orchestration & Automation	SOAR Integration	Playbooks	API security	API integrations between systems		
\$200k	\$250k	\$200k	\$100k	\$50k	\$500k		
					AD/LDAP		
					IDAM/RBAC	SIEM	UEBA
					IP management tools/IPAM	Configuration management databases	IDAM/RBAC & HR



Further questions?





Adapted from Knoster, T., Villa R., & Thousand, J. (2000). A framework for thinking about systems change. In R. villa & J. Thousand (Eds.), Restructuring for caring and effective education: Piecing the puzzle together (pp. 93-128). Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes Publishing Co.

https://intenseminimalism.com/2015/a-tramework-tor-thinking-about-systems-change/



NTT DATA MESSAGING SERVICES

STEVE COLLE


ARI FRIEDMAN

NTT DATA


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




VITA Messaging Service Architectural Framework











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

















Archive 2 Azure includes:


 Perform all eDiscovery tasks including FOIA requests, legal discovery, legal hold, content search document preservation, redaction, classification, workload division with status tracking, and export of data in multiple industry standard formats.

Agency requirements:

 Can be configured for agency specific requirements.














Donoma includes:

- Speech-to-Text transcription of voicemail provided in email along with audio file
- Click-to-call for return phone calls
- Reply by email for internal callers
- All data is encrypted in transit and at rest.
- Only ephemeral data stored in provider platform











Upcoming events

Each organization shall:

Annually, by January 31, submit to VITA their proposed annual IT security awareness training plans with appropriate artifacts to VITA for approval (using the form in Appendix I or using a VITA supplied web portal if available).

Use the approved security awareness training for its employees/contractors

Provide employees and contractors agency cybersecurity training *within 30 days of initial employment* or contract engagement and by January 31 of each year thereafter.

Annually submit the following compliance information to VITA (using the table in Appendix II or by web portal when available):

A certification statement that all employees and contractors have completed required training,

An evaluation of the efficacy of the cybersecurity training program that the agency provided,

Any requests for improvement to the curriculum or other aspects of the training program.



ISO CERTIFICATION END OF YEAR REQUIREMENTS

You have until Dec. 31, 2021 to complete any outstanding requirements for your 2021 ISO Certification.

Contact Tina Gaines if you have any questions.



74

LITMOS END OF YEAR TRAINING CLOSE OUT

If you are part of VITA ISO Services or have an agreement with VITA to link to our security awareness training solution, please join us for our LITMOS End of Year security awareness training review.

Presenter: Debra Hurst (SANS)

Date: Dec. 2, 2021 at 11 a.m.

https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.gotomeet.me/DebraHurst&sa=D&source= calendar&ust=1638654657771600&usg=AOvVaw0cw62D6Kvj6XiJNxrmP4aG



75

IS ORIENTATION

Final IS Orientation 2021

Dec. 8, 2021, 1 – 3 p.m.

Presenter: Marlon Cole

Registration Link : https://covaconf.webex.com/covaconf/onstage/g.php?MTID=e6299241 bfefde9a4e45b6e1b8a81e7cb

vita.virginia.gov | Virginia IT Agency



JANUARY 2022 ISOAG

Jan. 12, 2022, from 1 to 4 p.m.

Presenters:

Rick Shaw – Awareity

Barry Condrey – CIO Chesterfield County

Beth Waller – Woods Rogers

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THANK YOU FOR ATTENDING!